September, 2009 Technical Newsletter Provided by Leimberg Information Services
See
other issues.
Akers on Pierre
In
Estate Planning Email Newsletter #1511,
LISI
provided members with commentary on the Pierre case. Now, Steve
Akers provides members with his analysis of Pierre, which further
underscores the contentious nature of this case.
Steve R. Akers is a
managing director at Bessemer Trust, where he directs the family estate
and legacy planning practice for the Southwest Region.
Steve has lectured on a
variety of estate planning, estate administration, and family business
planning topics at national meetings of the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel; American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Annual CLE Meetings; the U.S.C. Tax Institute; the University of Miami Philip
E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning; the Annual Notre Dame Tax and
Estate Planning Institute and the Southern Federal Tax Conference – among many
others.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Gifts and sales of interests
in a single-member LLC to two trusts (12 days after the LLC was created) were
treated for federal gift tax purposes as transfers of interests in the entity
(with the possibility of discounts) rather than as transfers of proportionate
shares of the underlying assets owned by the LLC, even though the
single-member LLC was treated as a disregarded entity pursuant to the
check-the-box regulations. This conclusion came from a rather divided Tax
Court, with 10 judges joining the majority and 6 judges dissenting.
FACTS:
1) Mother wanted to provide for her son and granddaughter, but was
concerned about keeping her family's wealth intact. A plan was developed for
her to fund an LLC and make transfers of interests in the LLC to trusts for
her son and granddaughter.
2) On July 13, 2000, Mother organized a single-member LLC. She did not
elect to treat the LLC as a corporation for federal tax purposes by filing
Form 8832, so by default it was treated as a disregarded entity.
3) On September 15, 2000, Mother transferred $4.25 million in cash and
marketable securities to the LLC.
4) Twelve days later, on September 27, 2000, Mother transferred her
entire interest in the LLC to two separate trusts, one for her son and one for
her granddaughter. This happened in two steps. First, she gave a 9.5%
interest to each trust. Then she sold a 40.5% interest to each trust for a
secured note, with the face amount determined by an appraisal that applied a
30% discount (although a mistake in valuing the underlying assets resulted in
a 36.55% discount.)
5) Mother filed a gift tax return for 2000 reporting the gifts. The IRS
took the position that the transfers made by gift and sale should be valued as
a proportionate share of the underlying assets (without a discount).
Issue
"The issue to be decided is
whether certain transfers of interests in a single-member limited liability
company (LLC) that is treated as a disregarded entity pursuant to sections
301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3, Proceed. & Admin. Regs., known colloquially and
hereinafter referred to as the check–the-box regulations, are valued as
transfers of proportionate shares of the underlying assets owned by the LLC or
are instead valued as transfers of interests in the LLC, and, therefore,
subject to valuation discounts for lack of marketability and control." A
separate opinion will address "(1) Whether the step transaction doctrine
applies to collapse the separate transfers to the trusts and (2) the
appropriate valuation discount, if any."
Holding
"[T]ransfers to the trusts
should be valued for Federal gift tax purposes as transfers of interests in
Pierre LLC and not as transfers of a proportionate share of the underlying
assets of Pierre LLC."
Analysis of Majority:
1) IRS Position. Mother elected to treat the LLC as a disregarded
entity separate from its owner "for federal tax purposes" under the
check-the-box regulations. Regulation §301.7701-3(a) provides that "[w]hether
an organization is an entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes
is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the organization
is recognized as an entity under local law." Because the LLC is treated as a
disregarded entity, the transfers of interests in the LLC should be treated as
transfers of cash and marketable securities, i.e., proportionate shares of the
LLC's assets, rather than as transfers of interests in the LLC for purposes of
valuing the transfers to determine federal gift tax liability.
2) Taxpayer Position. State law, not federal tax law, determines
the nature of a taxpayer's interests in property transferred and the legal
rights inherent in that property interest. Under New York law, a member has no
interest in specific property of the LLC. Accordingly, the transfers of
interests in the LLC were properly valued as interests in the LLC with
appropriate lack of control and lack of marketability discounts.
3) Historical Gift Tax Valuation Regime. The U.S. Supreme Court
has clarified that the federal gift tax is constitutional as an excise tax
rather than a direct tax (which must be apportioned proportionately by
population) because it is a tax on the power to give property to another. "A
fundamental premise of transfer taxation is that State law creates property
rights and interests, and Federal tax law then defines the tax treatment of
those property rights." The conclusion to be drawn from the general principles
is that "there was no State law ‘legal interest or right' in [the LLC assets]
for Federal law to designate as taxable, and Federal law could not create a
property right in those assets. Consequently, pursuant to the historical
Federal gift tax valuation regime, petitioner's gift tax liability is
determined by the value of the transferred interests in Pierre LLC, not by a
hypothetical transfer of the underlying assets of Pierre LLC."
4) Check-the-Box Regulations Merely Intended to Cover Classification
of Entities. The "Kintner Regulations," in place since 1960, addressed the
classification of entities for federal tax purposes and they became
"unnecessarily cumbersome to administer." To simplify the classification of
hybrid entities, such as LLCs, the check-the-box regulations were
promulgated. Regulation §301-7701-1(a)(1) provides:
"The Internal Revenue Code prescribes the classification of various
organizations for federal tax purposes. Whether an organization is an entity
separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of federal tax
law and does not depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity
under local law." Regulation §301.7701-3(a) provides that
"[a] business entity … can elect its classification for federal tax purposes
as provided in this section. An eligible entity … with a single owner can
elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner." "There is no question that the phrase ‘for federal
tax purposes' was intended to cover the classification of an entity for
Federal tax purposes, as the check-the-box regulations were designed to avoid
many difficult problems largely associated with the classification of an
entity as either a partnership or a corporation…"
Section 7701, which is the underpinning of the check-the-box regulations,
defines entities for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, but §7701(a) makes
clear that the definitions in that section apply "where not otherwise
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof." In
any event, §7701 does not make clear whether an LLC falls within the
definition of a partnership, a corporation, or a disregarded entity taxed as a
sole proprietorship.
5) Check-the-Box Regulations Do Not Alter Historical Federal Gift Tax
Valuation Regime.
The issue is whether the check-the-box regulations require disregarding a
single-member LLC, validly formed under state law, in deciding how to value
and tax a donor's transfer of an ownership interest in the LLC under the
federal gift tax regime. The IRS suggested several precedents for ignoring
state law restrictions. None of those precedents are applicable. McNamee
v. Dept. of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007) held that state law
cannot abrogate the federal employment tax obligations of the owner of a
disregarded entity under the check-the-box regulations; it did not hold that
an entity is to be disregarded in deciding what property interests are
transferred under state law. Similarly, Littriello v. United States,
484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007) and Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. Comm'r,
132 T.C. No. 7 (March 31, 2009) merely involved the classification of a
single-member LLC for purposes of liability for employment taxes, not
transfers of interests in a single-member LLC for gift tax purposes.
Shepherd and Senda held that a transfer of assets to a partnership
already owned by other partners (or where it cannot be determined whether the
contribution preceded the transfer of partnership interests) may represent an
indirect gift to the other partners. That is distinguished from the current
situation in which the taxpayer clearly contributed assets to the LLC before
transfers of ownership interests in the LLC to the trusts.
6) Conclusion. Congress has enacted several provisions that
explicitly disregard valid State law restrictions in valuing transfers (§§2701
and 2703), but when Congress has determined that the "willing buyer, wiling
seller" and other valuation rules are inadequate, it expressly has provided
exceptions to address valuation abuses (see chapter 14 of the Code). By
contrast, Congress has not acted to eliminate entity related discounts for
LLCs or other entities generally, or for single-member LLCs specifically.
"In the absence of such explicit congressional action and in the light of the
prohibition in section 7701, the Commissioner cannot by regulation overrule
the historical Federal gift tax valuation regime contained in the Internal
Revenue Code and substantial and well-established precedent in the Supreme
Court, the Courts of Appeals, and this Court, and we reject respondent's
position in the instant case advocating an interpretation that would do so.
Accordingly, we hold that petitioner's transfers to the trusts should be
valued for Federal gift tax purposes as transfers of interests in Pierre LLC
and not as transfers of a proportionate share of the underlying assets of
Pierre LLC."
The reviewed majority opinion, written by Judge Wells, was joined by nine
other judges (Cohen, Foley, Vasquez, Thornton, Marvel, Goeke, Wherry,
Gustafson, and Morrison).
Brief Overview of
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
1) Concurring Opinion by Judge Cohen. The check-the-box
regulations were a targeted substitute to the complexity of the Kintner
regulations, and a targeted solution to a particular problem should not be
distorted to achieve a comprehensive overhaul of a well-established body of
law.
The majority opinion does not disregard the plain meaning of the phrase "for
federal tax purposes" in the check-the-box regulations. First, the regulation
does not provide that an entity is disregarded "for all federal tax purposes,"
but the regulation implements a statute that by its terms applies except where
"manifestly incompatible with the intent" of the Internal Revenue Code. "The
language of the regulation requires a determination of which ‘federal tax
purposes' are implicated and whether a given purpose might be manifestly
incompatible with the Internal Revenue Code." Second, the statement that an
entity will be "disregarded as an entity separate from its owner" is ambiguous
and the regulation must be interpreted in light of the other principles of the
Internal Revenue Code, including the historical valuation principles. The
IRS's proposed application of the regulation is manifestly incompatible with
those principles.
The majority opinion does not involve the issue of deference to the
Commissioner's interpretation of a statute. Nothing in the check-the-box
regulations or in the cases cited requires disregarding a "single–owner LLC
where, as is the case here, to do so would be ‘manifestly incompatible' with
the intent of other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code."
The court has never accorded deference to the Commissioner's litigating
position, as contrasted to (1) contemporaneous expressions of intent when the
regulations were adopted and (2) consistent administrative interpretations
before the litigation.
(This concurring opinion was joined by eight other judges (all of the judges
that joined the majority opinion except Judge Morrison).)
2) Dissenting Opinion by Judge Halpern. Express language in the
check-the-box regulations seems to apply. Regulation §301-7701-2(a) says that
when an entity with only one owner is disregarded "its activities are treated
in the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch, or division of the
owner." Therefore, the LLC's activities are treated in the same manner as
those of a sole proprietorship. A sole proprietorship is generally understood
to have no legal identity apart from the proprietor.
If the "activities instruction" regulation is ambiguous, it must be construed,
and an agency's interpretation of its own regulation must be considered and
the courts will ordinarily show deference to such construction and give it
controlling weight. The government's position is consistent with the
Commissioner's administrative position for at least 10 years, evidenced by
Rev. Rul. 99-5, and cannot be dismissed as a mere litigating position. Rev.
Rul. 99-5 treated a sale by the owner of a single-member entity of a 50%
ownership interest in the entity as converting the entity to a partnership and
treated the purchaser as purchasing a 50% interest in each of the LLC's
assets, "which are treated as held directly by [the original single-member
owner] for federal tax purposes." Granted, that addresses sales for income tax
purposes, and the Commissioner has made no interpretation specifically for
gift tax purposes, but "a gift is the functional equivalent of a below-market
sale."
As to the deference issue, the majority opinion does not merely reject the
IRS's interpretation of the regulation but actually accepts that meaning and
rejects the activities instruction itself as an invalid construction of the
statute. McNamee, Littriello and Med. Practice Solutions, LLC have all
recognized the validity of the check-the-box regulations as applied to
single-member disregarded entities.
Judge Halpern's dissent was joined by Judges Kroupa and Holmes.
3) Dissenting Opinion by Judge Kroupa. The majority fails to
apply the plain meaning of the regulation, which requires that a single-member
LLC be disregarded for "federal tax purposes." The check-the-box regulations
are not simply rules of classification, but apply to the entire Code. The
regulations do not just apply for "federal income tax purposes," and the
drafters could have specifically excluded gift tax from the regulations' scope
had they intended to do so. The regulations consistently treat single owners
who choose non-corporate status for their LLCs as holding the property of
their disregarded entities.
Other guidance from the IRS treats the owner of a single-member LLC as the
owner of its underlying property, including Rev. Rul. 99-5 and numerous
private letter rulings (for example, such as the applicability of like-kind
exchange treatment). The majority invalidates the check-the-box regulations
for federal gift tax purposes to the extent that the term "federal tax
purposes" encompasses federal gift tax.
The majority opinion's reliance on the gift tax regime and valuing interests
that are recognized by state law is misplaced. The regulations provide the
federal tax consequences of what is, in effect, an agreement between the
taxpayer and the Commissioner to treat an entity in a certain way for federal
tax purposes despite the entity's state law classification. Three cases have
confirmed that the owner of single-member LLC is liable for federal employment
taxes even though state law provides that the owner is not personally liable
for the LLC's debts. McNamee, Littriello, and Med. Practice.
"Determining an owner's liability for employment taxes is as far removed from
determining the owner's income tax liability as is determining the owner's
gift tax liability."
The majority overlooks the broad scope of the gift tax statutes in concluding
that the check-the-box regulations are manifestly incompatible with the gift
tax regime. The gift tax regime includes indirect gifts (citing Dickman).
Substance over form principles have been used by the courts to get to the true
nature of a gift (citing Kerr, Astleford, and Estate of Murphy).
The courts have also used the step transaction doctrine in the area of gift
tax where intra-family transactions often occur (citing Senda and
Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989)).
"Conclusion The plain language of the regulations requires Pierre LLC to be
‘disregarded as an entity separate from its owner.' Unlike the majority, I
give meaning to these words. I do not minimize this language by labeling it a
classification. A plain language interpretation of the check-the-box
regulations must prevail. It is an interpretation of relevant regulations. It
is not manifestly incompatible with the gift tax statutes."
Judge Kroupa's dissent was joined by five other judges (Judges Colvin,
Halpern, Gale, Holmes, and Paris).
Observations
1) Case of First Impression; Discounts May Be Allowed for
Single-Member LLCs. The issue of how the disregarded "for federal tax
purposes" regulation will be applied for gift and estate tax purposes has been
an open issue since the check-the-box regulations were issued. This is the
first opinion addressing the valuation issue for a transfer of an interest in
a single-member LLC. It seems to be a rather close call, with six Tax Court
judges joining the dissent. The dissents make interesting arguments.
Nevertheless, in this case of first impression, the court decides that
discounts are not automatically disallowed for federal gift tax purposes when
the interests in a single-member LLC are transferred.
2) Different Possible Approach: Focus on What Is Transferred to
Hypothetical Willing Buyer. The judges obviously struggled with how the
regulation saying that the entity is disregarded for federal tax purposes
applies in the context of gift (and presumably estate) tax purposes. However,
the regulation applies during the time that the entity is a single-member
entity. For gift (and estate) tax purposes, the key is what is transferred.
At the instant a transfer is made, the entity is no longer a single-member
entity (unless it is transferred entirely to a single transferee). In this
case, there were multiple transfers (i.e., by gift and sale) to multiple
transferees. The gifts occurred first. After the initial transfers, the
entity clearly was not a single-member entity, and the value of the interests
subsequently sold do not seem to be affected by the regulation, which only
applies to single-member entities, unless the step transaction doctrine
somehow aggregates the gift and sale transactions.
In addition, the transfers in this case are to multiple transferees. Under
the principles of Rev. Rul. 93-12, the transfers to each separate transferee
are valued separately. In that context, the transfer to each necessarily will
not be interests in a single-member LLC.
One possible way of approaching the issue is to focus on the particular
interest being transferred, and whether it can possibly be treated as an
interest in a single-member entity. The answer for estate tax purposes may be
that it would be — that the focus would be on the single-member interest owned
by the estate, rather than focusing on who are the legatees of the interest
(and in particular, whether there are multiple transferees). Even for gift tax
purposes, if the court applies a step transaction doctrine to join all of the
different transfers into a single transfer, the issue of how the regulation
applies might arise. Aside from those situations, the niceties of whether the
regulation applies would be avoided under this alternate possible analysis.
But — that was not the court's approach.
This suggests a planning consideration. In the event that future cases may
resolve this issue differently (indeed, this was a very divided court),
consider first making a transfer of a very small interest in the entity (for
example, 1% or lower), in case a future court were to treat the transfer of an
interest in a single-member LLC as a proportionate transfer of the underlying
assets (without a discount). If the client later decides to transfer further
interests in the entity, it would no longer be a single-member entity, so the
regulation would not apply, unless the IRS were able to apply the step
transaction doctrine. How long of a delay would be necessary to avoid the step
transaction doctrine?
If future courts were to apply an analysis similar to Holman, the focus
might be on whether there was a real risk of an economic change in value
during the intervening time period. Of course, there may be important reasons
for keeping the entity as a single-member disregarded entity rather than
having it convert to a partnership for income tax purposes. If that were
important, the transfers would typically be made to grantor trusts, and it is
not clear how the single-member LLC regulations would apply in this context if
there were various transfers to a single grantor trust. During the time that
the original grantor and the grantor trust each held interests in the LLC,
those interests are recognized as separate ownership interests for estate and
gift tax purposes, but it is not clear how the single-member entity
regulations would apply for estate and gift tax purposes. On the other hand,
if there were transfers to multiple grantor trusts for differing
beneficiaries, it would be harder for the government to maintain that the
entity is still a single-member entity for estate and gift tax purposes.
3) Step Transaction Doctrine; Aggregation. The step transaction
doctrine is arising with increasing frequency. At one time, many planners
argued that the step transaction doctrine was an income tax doctrine that did
not apply at all to the estate and gift tax. Now, it seems to be a rather
commonplace argument in gift and estate tax cases (and the very broad
reasoning in the Litton and Heckerman cases is quite troubling —
suggesting that the doctrine might apply almost whenever an individual has an
intent to transfer assets to children while minimizing transfer taxes).
Footnote 1 indicates that there will be a separate opinion addressing "whether
the step transaction doctrine applies to collapse the separate transfers to
the trusts." Footnote 4 indicates that the IRS did not argue that the step
transaction doctrine should be applied to disregard the LLC entirely.
Instead, the IRS argues that the step transaction doctrine should apply to the
gift and sale transfers, but "explicitly limits the proposed application of
the step transaction doctrine to the events of Sept. 27, 2000." That is the
date the gifts and sales occurred with the two separate trusts. Will the IRS
argue that all four transactions (i.e., gift to Trust 1, sale to Trust 1, gift
to Trust 2, and sale to Trust 2) should be treated as one transaction? That
would involve the collapse of the multiple transactions with each transferee
as well as the transactions of one transferee with the other transferee.
What if the two transferee trusts are each grantor trusts? Does that change
the analysis? For income tax purposes, the grantor is treated as the owner of
the assets of the grantor trust, so the owner may still be treated as the
owner of the interests, but for estate and gift tax purposes, the trusts are
separate legal entities and should not be deemed to be owned by the grantor of
the grantor trust. Even if the trusts are grantor trusts, they should not be
treated as being a single member (i.e., Mother in this case) for estate and
gift tax purposes.
The IRS is not arguing that the funding of the LLC and the subsequent
transfers of interests in the LLC should be treated as transfers of assets
contributed to the LLC under the step transaction doctrine as discussed in the
Holman, Senda, Gross, Linton, and Heckerman cases. (That would
involve applying the step transaction doctrine to the events of Sept. 15-27,
2000, not just to the events of Sept. 27.) Footnote 12 specifically made the
observation that the subsequent transfers were made 12 days after the funding
of the LLC and that Holman had refused to apply the indirect gift
analysis "where assets were transferred to a partnership 5 days before the
gifts of the partnership interests."
Observe: The Holman facts indicate that the gift of partnership
interests in the partnership holding Dell stock was made 6 days after funding
in that case and the Gross case involved contributions of marketable
securities 11 days before the transfers of partnership interests.
The step transaction issue obviously involves an aggregation issue, as to
whether transfers to multiple recipients should be aggregated. That would
seem to be a very difficult argument for the IRS in light of its position in
Rev. Rul. 93-12. The aggregation issue is important because if a transfer is
made to a single member, even if it is treated as an interest in an entity
rather than as a transfer of all of the assets, if the single member could
dissolve the entity at any time under state law, the IRS would likely argue
for very low (if any) discounts. If the transfers to multiple transferees are
not ignored under the step transaction doctrine, it would generally no longer
be possible for any single recipient to have the power to force the
liquidation of the entity, so avoiding aggregation of the interests held by
the separate transferees is very important.
How will the court apply the step transaction doctrine? Planners were
generally very surprised with the way that the Tax Court chose to apply the
step transaction doctrine in Holman (followed by Gross). If the
court applies a similar analysis, i.e., whether there is a real risk of an
economic change in value between the different steps in the transaction, it
would seem that the gifts and sales made on the same day may be aggregated.
However, that would not address combining the transfers to the separate trusts
as a single transfer. If the transfers to the multiple recipients are
respected, it would seem that the interests actually transferred would be
entitled to entity level discounts under the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 93-12.
4) Estate Tax Implications. The analysis presumably would be the
same for estate tax purposes as to whether the interest in a single-member LLC
is valued as an interest in the entity or valued at an amount equal to the
value of the underlying assets. Even if the decedent is treated as holding an
interest in the entity rather than the underlying assets, the IRS may argue
that no discount should be appropriate if under state law the decedent could
unilaterally control when the entity would be liquidated and receive the
underlying assets, and could transfer that right to another single recipient.
While the focus would still be valuing an interest in an entity, very low
discounts may be applied if the decedent or the decedent's estate has the
ability to reach the underlying assets at any time.
If that is the analysis that emerges in future estate tax cases involving
interests in single-member LLCs, the primary importance of this case will be
its direct application for gift tax purposes rather than possible ancillary
effects for estate tax purposes.
In Mirowski, the IRS made its typical argument that the bona fide sale
exception to §2036 did not apply, in part because "Ms. Mirowski sat on both
sides of Ms. Mirowski's transfers" to a single-member LLC. The court rejected
that argument, because it would mean that the bona fide sale exception to
§2036 could never apply to the creation of a single-member LLC, and the court
would not read out of the statute an exception that "Congress expressly
prescribed when it enacted that statute."
HOPE THIS HELPS YOU HELP OTHERS MAKE A POSITIVE DIFFERENCE!
Steve Akers
EDITOR'S COMMENT:
This case has generated a
great deal of feedback from our LISI
authors. Here's what Mike Jones of Thompson Jones LLP had to say:
Is it just me, or do others
wonder as I do how in the world this case and the Tax Court's analysis got so
complicated?
It's as easy as counting past one to determine whether a business entity can
be disregarded. For an LLC to be a "disregarded entity" there must be only one
"owner" (in an LLC, an "owner" is called a "member"). In other words, the rule
is: one member means the LLC is disregarded (unless an election is made to be
treated as a corporation). But the mere presence of more than one member means
the LLC is never disregarded.
The transfer of only part of what was a single member LLC terminates
disregarded entity status by reason of exceeding more than one member. Now
it's a partnership for tax purposes (unless corporate status is elected).
That means any transferor who transfers part of an LLC that is a disregarded
entity isn't capable of transferring an interest in a disregarded entity.
Therefore, the transferor is transferring a non-disregarded entity by the very
definition contained in the check the box regulations.
Am I missing something here?
The absurdity of the premise that check the box regulations control valuation
in such a case is further demonstrated by considering an LLC that elects to be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes. Is the IRS saying the valuation
analysis should "treat" the member's interest as corporate stock subject to
state laws applicable to corporations? If so, the fiction of property rights
under state corporation laws would be treated as the property rights that must
be valued for transfer tax purposes. But we all know those aren't the property
rights actually transferred. The suggestion that the check the box
regulations could force a state law fiction for valuation purposes is patently
absurd. Let's be glad the Tax Court rendered a very sensible decision we can
all live with.
Of course, this decision will (and should) cut both ways. If the transfer were
a lifetime charitable gift instead of a family gift, don't expect a charitable
income tax deduction under the theory of a disregarded entity.
CITE AS:
LISI Estate Planning Newsletter #1516
(September 3, 2009) at
http://www.leimbergservices.com Reproduction in Any Form or Forwarding to
Any Person Prohibited – Without Express Permission.
CITES:
Pierre v. Comr., 133 T.C.
No. 2 20009; Heckerman v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-00211 (W.D. Wash.
July 27, 2009); Linton v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-00227 (W.D. Wash.
July 1, 2009); Shepherd v. Comr., 115 T.C. 376 (2000), aff'd 283 F. 3d
1258 (11th Cir. 2002); Senda v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2004-160, aff'd 433 F.
3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006); Estate of Jones v. Comr., 116 T.C. No. 11
(2001); Gross v. Comr., T.C. Memo 2008-221; Holman v. Comr., 130
T.C. No. 12 (2008); Astleford, T.C. Memo 2008-128, Littriello v.
United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007) and Med. Practice
Solutions, LLC v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. No. 7 (March 31, 2009) Treas. Reg. Sec.
25.2511-1(h)(1); Revenue Ruling 93-12
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